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Addiction’s biological basis has been the focus of much research. The findings have per-
suaded experts and the public that drug use in addicts is compulsive. But the word
“compulsive” identifies patterns of behavior, and all behavior has a biological basis, includ-
ing voluntary actions. Thus, the question is not whether addiction has a biology, which it
must, but whether it is sensible to say that addicts use drugs compulsively. The relevant
research shows most of those who meet the American Psychiatric Association’s criteria for
addiction quit using illegal drugs by about age 30, that they usually quit without professional
help, and that the correlates of quitting include legal concerns, economic pressures, and
the desire for respect, particularly from family members. That is, the correlates of quitting
are the correlates of choice not compulsion. However, addiction is, by definition, a disorder,
and thereby not beneficial in the long run.This is precisely the pattern of choices predicted
by quantitative choice principles, such as the matching law, melioration, and hyperbolic dis-
counting. Although the brain disease model of addiction is perceived by many as received
knowledge it is not supported by research or logic. In contrast, well established, quantitative
choice principles predict both the possibility and the details of addiction.
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INTRODUCTION
Addictive drugs change the brain, genetic studies show that alco-
holism has a substantial heritability, and addiction is a persistent,
destructive pattern of drug use (e.g., Cloninger, 1987; American
Psychiatric Association, 1994; Robinson et al., 2001). In scien-
tific journals and popular media outlets, these observations are
cited as proof that “addiction is a chronic, relapsing brain dis-
ease, involving compulsive drug use” (e.g., Miller and Chappel,
1991; Leshner, 1999; Lubman et al., 2004; Quenqua, 2011). Yet,
research shows that addiction has the highest remission rate of
any psychiatric disorder, that most addicts quit drugs without
professional help, and that the correlates of quitting are those
that attend most decisions, such as financial and familial con-
cerns (e.g., Biernacki, 1986; Robins, 1993; Stinson et al., 2005;
Klingemann et al., 2010). However, addiction is “disease-like” in
the sense that it persists even though on balance its costs outweigh
the benefits (e.g., most addicts eventually quit). Thus, in order
to explain addiction, we need an account of voluntary behav-
ior that predicts the persistence of activities that from a global
bookkeeping perspective (e.g., long-term) are irrational. That is,
addiction is not compulsive drug use, but it also is not rational
drug use. Several empirical choice principles predict the possi-
bility of relatively stable yet suboptimal behavior. They include
the matching law, melioration, and hyperbolic discounting (e.g.,
Herrnstein, 1990; Ainslie, 1992). These principles were discov-
ered in the course of experiments conducted in laboratories and
natural settings, and in experiments these same principles also
distinguish addicted from non-addicted drug users (e.g., Kirby
et al., 1999). For example, ex and current heavy drug users were
more likely to suboptimally “meliorate” than were non-addicts in
a choice procedure that invited both long-term maximizing and
melioration (Heyman and Dunn, 2002). Thus, we have on hand
a research based, non-disease account of the defining features of
addiction, which is to say its destructive and irrational aspects. As
this essay is based on how those we call addicts behave, it would
be most efficient to begin with a brief summary of key aspects of
the natural history of addiction.
LIKELIHOOD OF REMISSION AND TIME COURSE OF
ADDICTION
Figure 1 shows the cumulative frequency of remission as a func-
tion of the onset of dependence in a nation-wide representative
sample of addicts (United States, Lopez-Quintero et al., 2011).
The researchers first recruited a sample of more than 42,000 indi-
viduals whose demographic characteristics approximated those of
the US population for individuals between the ages of 18 and
64 (Grant and Dawson, 2006). The participants were interviewed
according to a questionnaire designed to produce an APA diagno-
sis when warranted. For those who currently or in the past met
the criteria for “substance dependence” (the APA’s term for addic-
tion), there were additional questions aimed at documenting the
time course of clinically significant levels of drug use. Figure 1
summarizes the findings regarding remission and the duration of
dependence.
On the x-axis is the amount of time since the onset of depen-
dence. On the y-axis is the cumulative frequency of remission,
which is the proportion of individuals who met the criteria for
lifetime dependence but for the past year or more had been in
remission. The fitted curves are negative exponentials, based on
the assumption that each year the likelihood of remitting remained
constant, independent of the onset of dependence (Heyman,
2013).
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FIGURE 1 |The cumulative frequency of remission as a function of
time since the onset of dependence, based on Lopez-Quintero et al.’s
(2011) report. The proportion of addicts who quit each year was
approximately constant. The smooth curves are based on the negative
exponential equations listed in the figure.
The cumulative frequency of remission increased each year for
each drug. Indeed, the theoretical lines so closely approximated the
observations that the simplest account is that each year a constant
proportion of those who had not yet remitted did so regardless
of how long they had been addicted. By year 4 (since the onset of
dependence) half of those who were ever addicted to cocaine had
stopped using cocaine at clinically significant levels; for marijuana
the half-life of dependence was 6 years; and for alcohol, the half-
life of dependence was considerably longer, 16 years. As the typical
onset age for dependence on an illicit drug is about 20 (Kessler
et al., 2005a), the results say that most people who become addicted
to an illicit drug are “ex-addicts” by age 30. Of course, addicts may
switch drugs rather than quit drugs, but other considerations indi-
cate that this does not explain the trends displayed in Figure 1. For
example, dependence on any illicit drug decreases markedly as
a function of age, which would not be possible if addicts were
switching from one drug to another (Heyman, 2013).
The graph also shows that there is much individual variation.
Among cocaine users, about 5% continued to meet the criteria for
addiction well into their 40s; among marijuana users, about 8%
remained heavy users well into their 50s, and for alcoholics, more
than 15% remained heavy drinkers well into their 60s. Thus, for
both legal and illegal drugs some addicts conform to the expecta-
tions of the “chronic disease” label. However, as noted below, the
correlates of quitting drugs are the correlates of decision making,
not the correlates of the diseases addiction is said to be similar to.
CANWE TRUST THE DATA?
The results in Figure 1 replicate the findings of previous nation-
wide surveys and targeted studies that selected participants so as
to obtain representative samples (e.g., Robins and Murphy, 1967;
Anthony and Helzer, 1991; Robins, 1993; Warner et al., 1995;
Kessler et al., 2005a,b). For instance, in every national scientific
survey of mental health in the United States, most of those who
met the criteria for dependence on an illicit drug no longer did
so by age 30, and addiction had the highest remission rate of
any other psychiatric disorder. However, research on remission
faces well-known methodological pitfalls. Those in remission may
relapse at some post-interview date, and the subject rosters of
the large epidemiological studies may be biased in favor of those
addicts who do quit. For instance, addicts who remain heavy drug
users may not cooperate with researchers or may be hard to contact
because of their life style, illnesses, or have higher mortality rates.
These issues have been discussed in some detail elsewhere (Hey-
man, 2013). The key results were that remission after age 30 was
reasonably stable, and that it was unlikely that there were enough
missing or dead addicts to alter significantly the trends displayed
in Figure 1.
THE CORRELATES OF QUITTING AND THE ROLE OF
TREATMENT
The correlates of quitting include the absence of additional psychi-
atric and medical problems, marital status (singles stay addicted
longer), economic pressures, fear of judicial sanctions, concern
about respect from children and other family members, worries
about the many problems that attend regular involvement in ille-
gal activities, more years spent in school, and higher income (e.g.,
Waldorf, 1983; Biernacki, 1986; Waldorf et al., 1991; Warner et al.,
1995). Put in more personal terms, addicts often say that they
quit drugs because they wanted to be a better parent, make their
own parents proud of them, and not further embarrass their fam-
ilies (e.g., Premack, 1970; Jorquez, 1983). In short, the correlates
of quitting are the practical and moral concerns that affect all
major decisions. They are not the correlates of recovery from the
diseases addiction is said to be like, such as Alzheimer’s, schizo-
phrenia, diabetes, heart disease, cancer, and so on (e.g., Leshner,
1999; McLellan et al., 2000; Volkow and Li, 2004).
Much of what we know about quitting drugs has been pro-
vided by researchers who study addicts who are not in treatment
(e.g., Klingemann et al., 2010). This is because most addicts do
not seek treatment. For instance, in the survey that provided the
data for Figure 1, only 16% of those who currently met the crite-
ria for dependence were in treatment, and treatment was broadly
defined so as to include self-help organizations as well as services
by trained clinicians (Stinson et al., 2005). Since most addicts quit,
the implication is that most addicts quit without professional help.
Research supports this logic (e.g., Fiore et al., 1993).
A NON-DISEASE ETIOLOGY FOR PERSISTENT
SELF-DESTRUCTIVE DRUG USE
Although self-destructive, irrational behavior can be a sign of
pathology, it need not be. The self-help industry is booming, which
reflects the tendency of so many of us to procrastinate, overeat,
skip exercising, and opt for whatever is most convenient. Why buy
a book or go to a lecture on how to improve your life if you did
not realize that (1) you were behaving imprudently, (2) knew you
probably could change, but (3) so far have not taken the requisite
steps. Similarly, human irrationality drives the story-line of most
novels, memoirs, movies, and plays. Agamemnon sacrifices his
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own daughter to advance his political and personal goals but then
publicly embarrasses Achilles his most powerful and skillful war-
rior. Both actions are selfish, and the second undermines the goals
of the first, which anyone could have foretold. However, Homer is
portraying human nature not writing a psychiatric text. Thus, it
seems fair to say that who cite selfishness and myopic choices as
evidence of pathology (e.g., “she has to be sick because she bought
drugs rather than groceries”) naively misread human nature.
In support of the poet’s as opposed to the brain disease account
of human nature, behavioral psychologists and economists have
discovered principles that predict self-defeating, selfish patterns of
behavior. They include “hyperbolic discounting,” “melioration,”
and the “matching law” (Herrnstein, 1970, 1990; Rachlin and
Green, 1972; Ainslie, 1992; Rachlin, 2007). These are quantitative,
empirical laws of choice that predict how different species, includ-
ing humans, choose between different commodities and activities,
such as food, water, and exercise. Their relevance to addiction and
other self-defeating behaviors is that under some conditions they
predict relatively stable yet suboptimal patterns of behavior. For
example, Heyman and Herrnstein (1986) arranged an experiment
in which the matching predicted the lowest possible rate of rein-
forcement. As predicted the subjects shifted to matching, lowering
their overall reinforcement rate as they did so. This finding has
been replicated numerous times (e.g., Herrnstein et al., 1997), and
it is analogous as to what happens as drug use turns into addiction.
Or, put another way, general principles that apply to everyday
choices, also predict compulsive-like consumption patterns that
are consistent with the behavior of addicts.
These choice laws reflect a basic, but often overlooked property,
of most choice situations. There is more than one “optimal” strat-
egy (Heyman, 2009). One is optimal from the perspective of the
most immediate circumstances, such as the current values of the
options, taking into account just the most pressing needs and goals.
The others are optimal in terms of wider time horizons and the
perspectives of others. For example, in settings in which current
choices affect the values of future options, it is possible for the cur-
rent best choice to be the worst long-term choice (e.g., Herrnstein
et al., 1993; Heyman and Dunn, 2002). This is relevant because a
common feature of addictive drugs is that they provide immediate
benefits but delayed costs. Thus, it is possible that the drug is the
best choice when the frame of reference is restricted to the current
values of the immediately available options but the worst choice
when the frame of reference expands to include future costs and
other people’s needs. According to this account, persistent drug use
reflects the workings of a local optimum, whereas controlled drug
use or abstinence reflects the workings of a global optimum. Put
somewhat differently, whether or not drug use persists depends
on the factors that influence decision making, particularly values
that emphasize global as opposed to a local frame of reference
(e.g., values related to family, the future, one’s reputation, and so
on). Scores of studies support this analysis (e.g., Waldorf, 1983;
Biernacki, 1986; Mariezcurrena, 1994; Klingemann et al., 2010).
OLD CLINICAL FOLLOW-UP STUDIES: EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
FOR THE DISEASE ACCOUNT
Imagine that what we knew about addiction was restricted to those
individuals who make up the right-hand tails of the cumulative
distribution curves in Figure 1. We would have good reason to
believe that addiction is a chronic relapsing disease. This is pre-
cisely the situation for much of the history of addiction research.
Until the mid 1970s virtually all empirical studies of addicts were
based on individuals who had been in treatment, which was most
often detoxification in American prison/hospitals or similar insti-
tutions (e.g., Brecher, 1972; Vaillant, 1973; Maddux and Desmond,
1980; Hser et al., 1993). In some studies virtually all of the partici-
pants were males with extensive arrest records, poor work histories,
lower than average marriage rates, and lower than average educa-
tional achievement (e.g.,Vaillant,1973). That is, the understanding
of addiction as a chronic disorder was based on a population of
drug users whose demographic characteristics – we now know –
match those that predict not quitting (e.g., Klingemann et al.,
2010). In the 1960s illicit drug use spread to college campuses and
upscale neighborhoods. This new generation of addicts included
individuals who were employed, married, and well-educated (e.g.,
Waldorf et al., 1991). With these demographic changes, the natural
history of addiction changed. More often than not, the pressures
of family, employment, and the hassles of an illegal life style
eventually trumped getting high. Figure 1, which is representa-
tive of every major epidemiological study conducted over the past
30 years, reflects this reality; received opinion does not.
BUT DRUGS CHANGE THE BRAIN
With the exception of alcohol, addictive drugs produce their bio-
logical and psychological changes by binding to specific receptor
sites throughout the body. As self-administered drug doses greatly
exceed the circulating levels of their natural analogs, persistent
heavy drug use leads to structural and functional changes in
the nervous system. It is widely – if not universally – assumed
that these neural adaptations play a causal role in addiction. In
support of this interpretation brain imaging studies often reveal
differences between the brains of addicts and comparison groups
(e.g., Volkow et al., 1997; Martin-Soelch et al., 2001) However,
these studies are cross-sectional and the results are correlations.
There are no published studies that establish a causal link between
drug-induced neural adaptations and compulsive drug use or
even a correlation between drug-induced neural changes and
an increase in preference for an addictive drug. For example,
in a frequently referred to animal study, Robinson et al. (2001)
found dendritic changes in the striatum and the prefrontal cortex
of rats who had self-administered cocaine. They concluded that
this was a “recipe for addiction.” However, they did not evaluate
whether their findings with rodents applied to humans, nor did
they even test if the dendritic modifications had anything to do
with changes in preference for cocaine in their rats. In principle
then it is possible that the drug-induced neural changes play lit-
tle or no role in the persistence of drug use. This is a testable
hypothesis.
First, most addicts quit. Thus, drug-induced neural plasticity
does not prevent quitting. Second, in follow-up studies, which
tested Robinson et al.’s claims, there were no increases in prefer-
ence for cocaine. For instance in a preference test that provided
both cocaine and saccharin, rats preferred saccharin (Lenoir et al.,
2007) even after they had consumed about three to four times
more cocaine than the rats in the Robinson et al study, and even
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though the cocaine had induced motoric changes which have been
interpreted as signs of the neural underpinnings of addiction (e.g.,
Robinson and Berridge, 2003). Third, Figure 1 shows that the
likelihood of remission was constant over time since the onset of
dependence. Although this is a surprising result, it is not without
precedent. In a longitudinal study of heroin addicts,Vaillant (1973)
reports that the likelihood of going off drugs neither increased nor
decreased over time (1973), and in a study with rats, Serge Ahmed
and his colleagues (Cantin et al., 2010) report that the probability
of switching from cocaine to saccharin (which was about 0.85) was
independent of past cocaine consumption. Since drugs change the
brain, these results suggest that the changes do not prevent quit-
ting, and the slope of Figure 1 implies that drug-induced neural
changes do not even decrease the likelihood of quitting drugs once
dependence is in place.
BUT THERE IS A GENETIC PREDISPOSITION FOR ADDICTION
Twin and adoption studies have repeatedly demonstrated a genetic
predisposition for alcoholism (e.g., Cloninger, 1987), and the lim-
ited amount of research on the genetics of illicit drug use suggests
the same for drugs such as heroin, cocaine, and marijuana (Tsuang
et al., 2001). However, all behavior has a genetic basis, including
voluntary acts. The brain is the organ of voluntary action, and
brain structure and development follow the blueprint set by DNA.
Thus, there is no necessary connection between heritability and
compulsion. In support of this point, monozygotic twins are much
more likely to share similar religious and political beliefs than are
dizygotic twins, even when they are separated before the age of
1 year old (e.g., Waller et al., 1990; McCourt et al., 1999). That is,
learned, voluntary religious and political beliefs have substantial
heritabilities just as do many involuntary human characteristics.
The relevance to addiction is that a genetic predisposition is not
a recipe for compulsion, just as brain adaptations are not a recipe
for compulsion.
SUMMING UP
Addiction involves an initial “honey moon” period, followed by
alternating periods of remission and relapse, and then an eventual
return to a more sober life. Most addicts quit using drugs at
clinically significant levels, they typically quit without professional
help, and in the case of illicit drugs, they typically quit before the
age of 30. The correlates of quitting include many of the factors
that influence voluntary acts, but not, according to Figure 1, drug
exposure once drug use meets the criteria for dependence. Thus,
we can say that addiction is ambivalent drug use, which even-
tually involves more costs than benefits (otherwise why quit?).
Behavioral choice principles predict ambivalent preferences, semi-
stable suboptimal behavior patterns, and the capacity to shift from
one option to another. In contrast, the brain disease account of
addiction fails to predict the high quit rates; it fails to predict
the correlates of quitting; it fails to predict the temporal pattern
of quitting; and it is tied to unsupportable assumptions, such as
the claims that neural adaptations, heritability, and irrationality
are prima facie evidence of disease. To be sure “compulsion” and
“choice” can be seen as points on a continuum, but Figure 1
and research on quitting make it clear that addiction is not a
borderline case.
It is time to think about addiction in terms of what the research
shows, particularly the more recent epidemiological studies, and it
is time to abandon the medical model of addiction. It does not fit
the facts. The matching law, melioration, and hyperbolic discount-
ing predict that drugs and similar commodities will become the
focus of destructive, suboptimal patterns of behavior. These same
choice models also predict that individuals caught in a destruc-
tive pattern of behavior retain the capacity to improve their lot
and that they will do so as a function of changes in their options
and/or how they frame their choices. This viewpoint fits the facts
of addiction and provides a practical guide to measures that will
actually help addicts change for the better.
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